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Available online 23 April 2016Thoughts arise spontaneously in ourmindswith remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated
with the early inception of a thought has proved challenging. Herewe addressed this issue by taking advantage of
the heightened introspective ability of experienced mindfulness practitioners to observe the onset of their spon-
taneously arising thoughts.We found subtle differences in timing among themany regions typically recruited by
spontaneous thought. In some of these regions, fMRI signal peaked prior to the spontaneous arising of a thought
—most notably in themedial temporal lobe and inferior parietal lobule. In contrast, activation in themedial pre-
frontal, temporopolar, mid-insular, lateral prefrontal, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices peaked together with
or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought.We propose that brain regions that show anteced-
ent recruitmentmay be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, while those that
show later recruitmentmay be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration andmetacognitive process-
ing of spontaneous thoughts. Our ﬁndings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding
the emergence of spontaneous thoughts andmay help account for some of spontaneous thought's peculiar qual-
ities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.







Where do thoughts come from? One of themost intriguing yet least
understood aspects of the humanmind is its tendency to spontaneously
give rise to words, images, and emotions that ﬂow effortlessly from one
topic to another. There is a stunning ubiquity of such spontaneously
arising mental content in people's lives: thoughts that occur without
our deliberate control take up asmuch as one-third of ourmental expe-
rience (Klinger and Cox 1987).
The last decade marked an upsurge of investigations into a number
of closely related mental phenomena, often investigated using terms
such as ‘mind-wandering’, ‘stimulus-independent thought’, or ‘task-un-
related thought’ (Christoff, 2012). Psychological research has focused on
the conditions that facilitate these kinds of thought processes, showing
that their frequency increases when task demands are low or when ex-
ternal sensory stimulation is weak (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). In
parallel, neuroscientiﬁc investigations have focused on identifying theUniversity of British Columbia,
nada.
. This is an open access article underbrain regions that are consistently recruited during such conditions.
The majority of investigations have placed particular emphasis on re-
cruitment of the default mode network (for review, see Christoff,
2012), although a number of executive control network regions are re-
cruited with equal consistency (Christoff et al., 2009a; Fox et al., 2015).
While these investigations have greatly improved our understanding of
which brain regions are engagedwhen spontaneous thought is ongoing,
we still have virtually no knowledge of how these various brain regions
contribute to the different components of a spontaneous thought expe-
rience and, in particular, which brain regions support the early incep-
tion of spontaneous thoughts (Smallwood, 2013).
The goal of the present study, therefore, was to investigate key brain
regions associated with the arising of spontaneous thoughts. To do this,
we set out to examine brain recruitment that occurs immediately prior
to the onset of a spontaneous thought. The central difﬁculty in investi-
gating this question lies in identifying the precise temporal onset of
spontaneously arising mental content. There are currently no third-
person behavioral measures that provide such information reliably,
making it necessary for scientists to use ﬁrst-person introspective re-
ports fromparticipants. Althoughmost individuals can provide fairly re-
liable descriptions of the basic contents of their thoughts (Hurlburt andthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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give rise to thought content is generally considered to be poor (Nisbett
andWilson, 1977). This apparent lack of introspective ability, combined
with the need for reliance on introspective measures, has created a
methodological knot that has tied the hands of researchers interested
in differentiating the neural systems associatedwith the early formation
of spontaneous thoughts.
The ability to detect the arising of spontaneous thoughts, however,
can vary across individuals (Seli et al., 2015) as well as within the
same individual (Zedelius et al., 2015). This raises the possibility
that the methodological difﬁculty described earlier can be tackled by
employing participants with heightened introspective skills, a method
known as neurophenomenology (Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015;
Varela, 1996). In this approach, participants with introspective training
give ﬁrst-person reports about their mental processes that are then re-
lated tomeasures of neural activity (Lutz et al., 2002). One form ofmen-
tal training that speciﬁcally focuses on observing the spontaneous
arising of one's own thoughts is mindfulness practice (Lutz et al.,
2008; Tang et al., 2015). Mindfulness training has been shown to en-
hance attention in numerous ways, including a greater ability to notice
subtle or rapid events, such as increased line length discrimination at vi-
sual threshold during a vigilance task (MacLean et al., 2010; Sahdra
et al., 2011; Zanesco et al., 2013) and improved second target detection
during an attentional blink task (Slagter et al., 2007). Speciﬁcally, intro-
spective ability appears to be enhanced through mindfulness training,
as shown by increased metacognitive memory conﬁdence judgments
(Baird et al., 2014) and greater accuracy in emotional self-awareness rel-
ative to no training (Sze et al., 2010). Thus,we employed a group of highly
experiencedmindfulness practitioners,who tracked the arising of sponta-
neous thoughts during fMRI scanning, to capitalize on this potentially
heightened introspective ability andmore speciﬁcally examine the neural
antecedents of spontaneous mental content as well as the full suite of
neural recruitment before, during, and after spontaneous thought reports.
We hypothesized that the medial temporal lobe would show prefer-
ential recruitment during the initial generation of spontaneous thought
as it is often recruited during rest (Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al.,
2004; Stark and Squire, 2001) and has been associated with memory re-
trieval (Squire et al., 2004), future thinking (Addis et al., 2009), andmen-
tal simulation (Hassabis et al., 2007), which form a large portion of
spontaneous thought content (Klinger, 2009; Klinger and Cox, 1987).
We also hypothesized that the medial and lateral prefrontal cortices,
also consistently recruited during rest (Christoff et al., 2009a; Fox et al.,
2015), would show increased recruitment after the initial generation
of spontaneous thought as they have been associated more with the
evaluation and monitoring of self-generated thought content (Buckner
et al., 2008; Dixon and Christoff, 2012; Dixon and Christoff, 2014; Dixon
et al., 2014; Fox and Christoff, 2014; Miller and Cohen, 2001).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Eighteen participants (8 male and 10 female;M= 49.91 years old,
SD=11.17, range=29.39–68.42) took part in the experiment. The par-
ticipants were long-term, expert mindfulness meditators with more
than 3000 h of lifetime meditation experience and at least 1 h of daily
practice in the Mahasi Vipassana tradition (M = 8338.60 h, SD =
5989.98, range = 3174–23,700). The number of hours reported did
not include practice in other traditions (e.g., Zen meditation, Transcen-
dental meditation, Goenka or body scanning meditation, Yoga, Tai Chi,
Qi Gong). Eligibility screening consisted of the administration of a med-
itation experience questionnaire and a phone interview by S.P., a former
Mahasi monk. The screening ensured consistency of the meditation
technique across participants and attainment of extensive knowledge
of and experience with the meditation technique through regular prac-
tice and attendance of several long-term intensive retreats.The participants were recruited from Vipassanameditation commu-
nities in Vancouver (BC, Canada), Vancouver Island (BC, Canada),
Boulder (CO, USA), San Francisco (CA, USA), and Seattle (WA, USA).
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with no MRI
contraindications and no current psychiatric medication use. Fourteen
were right-handed and 4 were left-handed, but all used their right
hand to respond during the experiment. From an original sample of
22 participants, three participants were excluded from the analyses
due to excessive motion (2 with N5° pitch rotation, and 1 with N5°
pitch rotation and N5 mm in the z-direction). One participant was ex-
cluded from the analyses due to technical problems with behavioral
data recording. All protocols were approved by the University of British
Columbia (UBC; Vancouver, BC, Canada) Clinical Research Ethics Board
and the UBCMRI Research Center. All participants gave informedwritten
consent prior to participating and received payment as compensation.
2.2. Procedure
One to two days prior to the actual scanning session, participants en-
gaged in a practice session identical to the actual scanning procedure in
a mock scanner environment in order to become acclimatized to the
task, button pressing, and scanner noises. Participants alternated be-
tween 30 s blocks of monitoring thoughts that arose spontaneously
(thought condition, Fig. 1A) and 30 s blocks of monitoring words that
appeared onscreen (word condition, Fig. 1B). During both blocks, partic-
ipants attended to the rising and falling of the abdomen (i.e., breathing).
Participants reported with a ﬁrst button press (index ﬁnger) to indicate
when a thought arose or when aword appeared onscreen (see Stimuli),
andwith a secondbutton press to indicatewhat type of thought orword
it was (index ﬁnger = image or symbol, middle ﬁnger = narrative or
inner speech, ring ﬁnger = emotion, pinky ﬁnger = body sensation).
Each word stayed onscreen until the ﬁrst button press. The ﬁrst button
press was followed by one asterisk (*) onscreen for 250ms and the sec-
ond button press was followed by two asterisks (**) onscreen for
250 ms to signal successful button presses. Each participant completed
three 9-min task runs. Each run consisted of 8 thought blocks and 8
word blocks; each participant therefore completed 24 thought blocks
and 24 word blocks in total. Blocks were separated by interstimulus in-
tervals (ISIs) with jittered durations (randomly chosen from 250 ms,
500 ms, or 750 ms), with each ISI appearing an equal number of times.
The instructionswere designed to be consistentwith a typical mind-
fulness practice session (Sayadaw, 1985, 2002): the ﬁrst and second
button presses roughly corresponded to the standard steps of (i) noting
the occurrence of thought and then (ii) labeling its content. In the
thought condition, participants were instructed to report on the occur-
rence of mental events that took attention away from one's breathing,
or became more prominent in attention than breathing. This enabled
the assessment ofmental content arisingwithout being explicitly elicited
by external cues in the environment. In the word condition, participants
were instructed to brieﬂy think about the deﬁnition of each word pre-
sented on the screen before responding. This enabled the assessment of
mental content elicited by external cues in the environment.
The onsets and categories of words presented within each word
blockwere selected in real-time by a computer algorithm that matched
the timing onsets and categories of words to the timing onsets and cat-
egories of spontaneous thoughts reported in the immediately preceding
thought block. Thus, each pair of thought andword blocks had the same
number of events, and these events had the same content categories
and appeared at the same time within the block.
2.3. Stimuli
Thewords presented duringwordmonitoring blockswere randomly
chosen from four lists that corresponded to the categories of thoughts
routinely identiﬁed during mindfulness meditation (Sayadaw, 1985,
2002) and covered a large portion of spontaneous thought content
Fig. 1. Experimental procedure. Participants alternated between (A) spontaneous thought detection blocks (30 s) and (B) matched word detection blocks (30 s). Participants indicated
with a ﬁrst button press as soon as they noticed a thought spontaneously arising, which served as the experimental measure of the thought's onset, and with a second button press
what category of thought it was, which allowed online matching of the subsequent word detection block. Each word block was constructed in real-time to correspond to the timing
and categories of spontaneous thoughts reported during the immediately preceding thought block, allowing a closely matched comparison between neural recruitment associated
with spontaneously arising and perceptually triggered mental content.
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emotion, or (iv) body sensation. Words in the image list consisted of 30
nouns (e.g., mountain, beach, rain, sun, pet) selected from the Medical
Research Council (MRC) Psycholinguistics Database (Wilson, 1988),
which had imageability, concreteness, and familiarity ratings of
500–700 (on scales of 100 = very low to 700 = very high) to ensure
ease of visualization. Words in the narrative list consisted of 30 nouns
(e.g., work, money, family, goals, health) selected from the Edinburgh
Associative Thesaurus (EAT) (Kiss et al., 1973), which were associated
with the types of current concerns that people tend to have and that
are thought to be major determinants of spontaneous thought content
(Klinger, 2009; Klinger and Cox, 1987). These included home and
household matters; employment and ﬁnance; partner, family, and rela-
tives; friends and acquaintances; love, intimacy, and sexual matters;
self-changes; education and training; health and medical matters; spir-
itual matters; and hobbies, pastimes, and recreation (Klinger and Cox,
2004). Words in the emotion list consisted of 30 adjectives (e.g., calm,
happy, sad, afraid,worried) also selected from the EAT that were associ-
ated with various emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, disgust,
fear, surprise). Words in the body sensation list consisted of 30 nouns
and adjectives similarly selected from the EAT that were associated
with various body sensations (e.g., warmth, tickle, vibration, pressure,
pain). Each word contained 3–10 letters and 1–3 syllables. The words
and ﬁxation cross appeared as gray text on a black background. The
task and stimuli were implemented and presented using E-Prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA, USA).2.4. Data acquisition
Functional and structural MRI data were collected using a 3.0 Tesla
Philips Intera MRI scanner (Best, Netherlands) with a standard head
coil. Head movement was restricted using foam padding around the
head. T2*-weighted functional images were acquired parallel to theanterior commissure/posterior commissure (AC/PC) line using a
single-shot gradient echo-planar sequence (EPI; repetition time
[TR] = 2 s, echo time [TE] = 30 ms, ﬂip angle [FA] = 90°, ﬁeld of view
[FOV] = 240 × 240 × 143 mm, matrix size =80 × 80, SENSE factor =
1.0). A total of 265 functional volumes were acquired for each task
run, each including 36 interleaved axial slices (3 mm thick with 1 mm
skip) covering the entire brain. Before functional imaging, an inversion
recovery prepared T1-weighted structural volume was acquired in the
same slice locations and orientation as the functional images using a
fast spin-echo sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 10 ms, FA = 90°, FOV =
224 × 224 × 143mm, acquisitionmatrix size= 240 × 235, reconstruct-
ed matrix size = 480 × 480, inversion delay [IR] = 800 ms, spin-echo
turbo factor = 5).2.5. Data preprocessing
fMRI data for each participant were preprocessed and analyzed
using SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Slice timing correction was per-
formed using sinc interpolation and resampling with the middle
(18th) slice as a reference point. All functional volumes were realigned
to the ﬁrst volume to correct for between-scan motion. The structural
volume was coregistered to the mean functional image and segmented
to extract a gray matter image. The segmented structural volume
was then spatially normalized to a gray matter image of the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) template and resliced to a voxel size of
2 × 2 × 2 mm. The derived spatial transformations were applied to
the realigned functional volumes to bring them into standardized MNI
space. Finally, the functional volumes were smoothed with an 8-mm
full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel to
compensate for residual between-subject variability after spatial nor-
malization and to permit application of Gaussian random ﬁeld theory
for corrected statistical inference (Friston et al., 1994). To ensure that
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where the signal might have been low due to susceptibility artifacts, a
mask was created by averaging and thresholding at N.80 the ﬁrst
preprocessed functional volume from all participants andwas explicitly
speciﬁed during model estimation at the individual level. To remove
low-frequency drift in the blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal,
the data were high-pass ﬁltered using an upper cut-off period of 128 s.
No global scaling was performed.
2.6. General linear model
Condition effects at each voxel were estimated according to the gen-
eral linear model for the whole-brain analyses. The model included (a)
the observed time series of intensity values, which represented the de-
pendent variable; (b) covariates modeling session-speciﬁc effects
(i.e., the six head movement parameters), later treated as confounds;
and (c) regressor functions constructed by convolving condition-
speciﬁc stick functions with a synthetic hemodynamic response func-
tion. The regressor functions were constructed to model each of the
thought (timage, tnarrative, temotion, and tsensation), word (wimage, wnarrative,
wemotion, and wsensation), and button press events and were compared
using pairwise contrasts for each participant. Group random-effects
analyses were then performed for each contrast. The resulting T maps
were subsequently transformed to the unit normal Z distribution to cre-
ate a statistical parametric map for each contrast. The threshold for sig-
niﬁcance was set at Z N 2.576 and p b .05 family-wise error (FWE)
cluster corrected for multiple comparisons.
Onsets for the thought andword events were speciﬁed at 4 s prior to
the corresponding ﬁrst button press. A period of 6 s (3 TRs) yielded
similar results as a period of 4 s but excluded more trials (i.e., those
that did not occur 6 s or more after a previous event).
2.7. Time course extraction
Percent signal change time courses for brain regions showing greater
activation during thought events compared toword eventswere extract-
ed for each participant using the MarsBaR toolbox in SPM8 (MARSeille
Boîte À Région d'Intérêt) (Brett et al., 2002). The extraction volumes
were 4-mm radius spheres centered on local maxima from the group-
level contrasts. Eight ﬁnite impulse response (FIR) functions were
used, one for each peristimulus time point within a trial window of
16 s following the onset of a thought or word event (speciﬁed at 4 s
before the ﬁrst button press). This allowed the estimation of a region
of interest's response over time without making assumptions about its
shape and thus the assessment of activation differences across trial
phases, compared to modeling the long duration of the hemodynamic
response function (Dale, 1999; Henson and Friston, 2007; Ollinger
et al., 2001).
2.8. Spatiotemporal partial least squares
Changes in neural recruitment over timeduring thought events com-
pared to word events were assessed using spatiotemporal partial least
squares. This whole-brain, multivariate technique identiﬁes the tempo-
ral evolution of spatial patterns of activity correlated with different
conditions across the length of an event and is not dependent on as-
sumptions about the shape and duration of the hemodynamic response
function (Lin et al., 2003; Lobaugh et al., 2001; McIntosh et al., 2004).
The non-rotated task version of spatiotemporal Partial Least Squares
(PLS) was used, which allows the speciﬁcation of a priori non-
orthogonal contrasts (instead of the rotated data-driven version that
identiﬁes orthogonal latent variables). One contrast was entered to ex-
amine differences in the pattern of neural recruitment across regions
and over time between thought andword events (thought Nword) with-
in a trial windowof 16 s (8 TRs) following the onset of a thought orword
trial (speciﬁed at 4 s before the ﬁrst button press). The statisticalsigniﬁcance of the results at p b .05 was computed using permutation
testing with 500 permutations. Correction for multiple comparisons
was not necessary as the whole spatiotemporal pattern was tested in
one analytical step instead of in a series of voxel-wise statistical tests.
The reliability of the results was computed using bootstrap estimation
of standard errors with 300 iterations. Reliable voxels were signiﬁed
by bootstrap ratios greater than 2.576, which is approximately equal
to a Z-score with p b .01.
3. Results
3.1. Frequency distribution and reaction times of reports
Participants reported an average of 67.33 thoughts (SD = 35.02)
throughout all scanning sessions and an average of 2.81 thoughts
(SD = 1.21) per thought block. However, only an average of 44.67
thoughts (SD = 15.03), or 73.80% of the thoughts reported, occurred
4 s or more after the previous thought report and were thus included
in the analyses. Of the thoughts included, 18.66% (M = 8.33, SD =
10.28) were images, 37.31% (M = 16.67, SD = 5.55) were narrative,
12.94% (M = 5.78, SD = 5.86) were emotions, and 31.09% (M =
13.89, SD=8.80)were body sensations. A two-way repeatedmeasures
ANOVA at the α= .05 level indicated that the number of thought re-
ports differed signiﬁcantly across the four thought types [F(3,51) =
7.01, p b .001], but not across the three scanning sessions [F(2,34) =
0.23, p N .05] or their interaction [F(6102) = 0.75, p N .05]. Follow-up
multiple paired t-tests with a Bonferroni correction (α = .05/6 =
.0083) revealed that there were signiﬁcantly more narrative reports
[t(17) = 6.82, p b .001] and body sensation reports [t(17) = 4.39,
p b .001] than emotion reports. The participants' age in years and
hours of meditation experience were not signiﬁcantly correlated,
at α= .05, with the overall number of thoughts reported or with the
different types of thoughts reported. In addition, participants responded
with the ﬁrst button press an average of 1145.28 ms (SD= 403.71 ms)
after the presentation of a word. They categorized a word with the sec-
ond button press an average of 971.96 ms (SD= 352.21 ms) after the
ﬁrst button press. They categorized a thought with the second button
press an average of 707.75 ms (SD= 358.16 ms) after the ﬁrst button
press signaling the arising of a thought.
3.2. Overall neural recruitment during spontaneous thought reports
Spontaneous thought, in the general population, is associated with a
consistent pattern of activation throughout the brain, including default
mode network regions, medial temporal lobe structures, and executive
control network areas (Fox et al., 2015). During spontaneous thought
events, the mindfulness practitioners in the present study showed neu-
ral recruitment that closelymirrored this pattern, as revealed by a stan-
dard general linear model analysis that identiﬁed all brain regions
where activation was greater in the time surrounding spontaneous
thought reports compared to the time surrounding word detection re-
ports (Fig. 2 and Table 1). These regions included bilateral temporopolar
cortex (Brodmann area [BA] 38; peak x, y, z=32, 6,−32 and−44,−2,
−44; Fig. 2A); bilateral hippocampus (BA 28;−26,−20,−22 and 24,
−14, −18; Fig. 2B); bilateral parahippocampus (BA 36; −16, −22,
−22 and 16,−36,−16; Fig. 2C); medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10; 2,
52, 12; Fig. 2D); bilateral mid-insula (BA 13; −36, 6, −12 and 46, 4,
−2; Fig. 2E); bilateral rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10;−30, 56,
14 and 18, 58, 22; Fig. 2F); left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9;
−28, 44, 28; Fig. 2G); dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32; 0, 26,
26; Fig. 2H); posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31; −14, −46, 30;
Fig. 2J); and right inferior parietal lobule (BA 39; 44,−76, 36; Fig. 2K).
In all of these regions, the parameter estimates during the thought con-
dition were positive relative to baseline, except in the inferior parietal
lobule, where it did not differ signiﬁcantly from baseline (Fig. 3). Enter-
ing the participants' number of reported thoughts, hours of meditation
Fig. 2. Overall neural recruitment during spontaneous thought reports. Relative to matched word trials, spontaneous thought trials were associated with greater activation in
(A) temporopolar cortex, (B) hippocampus, (C) parahippocampus, (D) medial prefrontal cortex, (E) mid-insula, (F) rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, (G) left dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, (H) dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, (J) posterior cingulate cortex, and (K) right inferior parietal lobule. Onsets for the spontaneous thought and matched word trials were
speciﬁed at 4 s before the corresponding button press. All activations were signiﬁcant at p b .05, family-wise error cluster-corrected for multiple comparisons. Results are displayed in
neurological orientation, with the right hemisphere depicted on the right, on the average high-resolution structural image.
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the signiﬁcance of the results and yielded similar activation maps.3.3. Neural recruitment prior to spontaneous thought reports
To speciﬁcally identify the neural antecedents of spontaneous
thought, we computed the average time courses of activation in each
of the brain regions identiﬁed in the standard general linearmodel anal-
ysis (Fig. 2 and Table 1). The spontaneous arising of thoughtwas associ-
ated with activation in default mode network, medial temporal lobe,
and paralimbic brain regions that preceded the onset of thought by sev-
eral seconds. The speciﬁc brain regionswhere activation peaked prior to
reports of spontaneous thought (Fig. 4) comprised themedial temporal
lobe, including bilateral hippocampus (BA 28;−26,−20,−22 and 24,
−14, −18; Fig. 4A,B) and bilateral parahippocampus (BA 36; −16,
−22,−22 and 16,−36,−16; Fig. 4C,D), the posterior cingulate cortexTable 1
Activation peaks for thought events (thought N word).
Region MNI coordinates
L/R/M BA x y z Voxels Z value
Frontal
Rostral ACC M 24 0 36 14 659 5.02
Dorsal ACC M 32 0 26 26 178 4.25
Superior frontal gyrus (MPFC) M 10 2 52 12 33 3.71
Middle frontal gyrus (RLPFC) L 10 −30 56 14 81 3.90
Middle frontal gyrus (RLPFC) R 10 18 58 22 357 3.46
Middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) L 9 −28 44 28 251 4.51
Mid-insula L 13 −36 6 −12 55 3.28
Mid-insula R 13 46 4 −2 505 4.86
Posterior insula R 13 36 −20 16 32 3.50
Supplementary motor area M 6 0 −26 66 165 3.14
Parietal
Posterior cingulate cortex M 31 −14 −46 30 55 3.15
Inferior parietal lobule R 39 44 −76 36 30 4.08
Superior parietal lobule L 5 −22 −38 58 31 2.86
Superior parietal lobule R 5 20 −42 56 117 2.88
Postcentral gyrus L 43 −50 −4 4 81 3.81
Postcentral gyrus R 43 52 −10 14 33 4.21
Temporal
Hippocampus L 28 −26 −20 −22 33 4.74
Hippocampus R 28 24 −14 −18 81 4.03
Parahippocampus L 36 −16 −22 −22 33 3.75
Parahippocampus R 36 16 −36 −16 184 4.13
Temporopolar cortex L 38 −44 −2 −44 122 3.52
Temporopolar cortex R 38 32 6 −32 61 3.52
Superior temporal gyrus L 22 −54 −10 6 33 3.55
Superior temporal gyrus R 22 60 −2 0 113 5.06
Subcortical
Dentate of cerebellum M – −14 −48 −34 47 3.34
Posterior cerebellum L – −48 −62 −36 232 3.92
Note. All activations were signiﬁcant at p b .05 FWE cluster corrected.(BA 31;−14,−46, 30; Fig. 4E), the right inferior parietal lobule (BA 39;
44,−76, 36; Fig. 4F), the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24; 0, 36,
14; Fig. 4G), and the right posterior insula (BA 13; 36,−20, 16; Fig. 4H).
3.4. Neural recruitment during and following spontaneous thought reports
Time courses of activation in the brain regions identiﬁed in the stan-
dard general linear model analysis (Fig. 2 and Table 1) also revealed re-
cruitment of additional areas simultaneous with and subsequent to
spontaneous thought detection. The brain regions where activation
peaked during reports of spontaneous thought (Fig. 5) comprised the
medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10; 2, 52, 12; Fig. 5A), right rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (BA 10; 18, 58, 22; Fig. 5B), bilateral temporopolar cor-
tex (BA 38;−44,−2,−44 and 32, 6,−32; Fig. 5C,D), and bilateralmid-
insula (BA 13;−36, 6,−12 and 46, 4,−2; Fig. 5E,F). In addition, the
brain regions where activation peaked after reports of spontaneous
thought (Fig. 6) included the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9;
−28, 44, 28; Fig. 6A), left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10;−30,
56, 14; Fig. 6B), and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32; 0, 26, 26;
Fig. 6C).
3.5. Neural recruitment over time during spontaneous thought reports
The progression of neural recruitment during the time surrounding
spontaneous thought reports, compared to the time surrounding word
detection reports, was examined using non-rotated task spatiotemporal
partial least squares, with the contrast being signiﬁcant at p b .001.
The positive saliences, or regions in which increases and decreasesFig. 3. Parameter estimates for activated brain regions. Histograms represent average
parameter estimates for the thought and word conditions in 4-mm radius spheres
centered on local maxima from the overall neural recruitment (Fig. 2 and Table 1). Error
bars represent the standard error of the mean.
Fig. 4. Activation peaks occurring prior to spontaneous thought detection were observed in (A–D) medial temporal lobe, including hippocampus and parahippocampus, (E) posterior
cingulate cortex, (F) right inferior parietal lobule, (G) rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and (H) right posterior insula. The graphs represent average percent signal change in 4-mm
radius spheres centered on local maxima from the overall neural recruitment (Fig. 2 and Table 1). The gray bars indicate the 4-s time period before the reported spontaneous thought
onset, while the hand icons mark the time point corresponding to the button press. The error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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(i.e., thought trials), are shown in Fig. 7 and listed in Table 2. The left hip-
pocampus (BA 28;−14,−36, 0; Fig. 7A), bilateral parahippocampus
(BA 36;−20,−20,−22 and 14,−38,−6; Fig. 7B), and right inferior
parietal lobule (BA 39/40; 50, −62, 46; Fig. 7C) were engaged
before reports of spontaneous thoughts (TR 2). Meanwhile, the right
temporopolar cortex (BA 38; 46, 2,−38; Fig. 7D), right posterior and
mid-insula (BA 13; 48,−10, 4 and 38, 4,−10; Fig. 7E), medial prefron-
tal cortex (BA 11;−8, 38,−14; Fig. 7F), posterior cingulate cortex (BA
31; 0,−60, 26; Fig. 7G), left inferior parietal lobule (BA 39;−46,−74,
32), and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9;−22, 40, 44)were en-
gaged during reports of spontaneous thoughts (TR 3). Finally, the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9; 28, 38, 30; Fig. 7J), bilateral
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10; −22, 58, 24 and 24, 54, 24),
and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24;−2, 18, 24; Fig. 7H) were
engaged after reports of spontaneous thoughts (TR 4).4. Discussion
Here we investigated the key neural regions associated with
the early inception of spontaneous thoughts. By taking advantage of
the introspective ability of mindfulness practitioners, the present
study was able to examine the brain regions associated with the arising
of spontaneous thought throughout the brain. Using this novel
neurophenomenology-based approach (Fazelpour and Thompson,
2015; Lutz et al., 2002; Varela, 1996), we were able to observe subtle
differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited by
spontaneous thought (Fox et al., 2015). Only in some of these brain
areas did neural activation peak prior to the spontaneous arising of a
thought–most notably in themedial temporal lobe and inferior parietal
lobule. How do these ﬁndings relate to previous research andwhat role
might these neural antecedents play in the generation of spontaneous
thought?
Fig. 5.Activation peaks occurring during spontaneous thought detectionwere observed in (A)medial prefrontal cortex, (B) right rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, (C,D) temporopolar cortex,
and (E,F) mid-insula. The graphs represent average percent signal change in 4-mm radius spheres centered on local maxima from the overall neural recruitment (Fig. 2 and Table 1). The
gray bars indicate the 4-s time period before the reported spontaneous thought onset, while thehand iconsmark the time point corresponding to the buttonpress. The error bars represent
the standard error of the mean.
Fig. 6. Activation peaks occurring subsequent to spontaneous thought detection were observed in (A) left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, (B) left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, and
(C) dorsal anterior cingulate. The graphs represent average percent signal change in 4-mm radius spheres centered on local maxima from the overall neural recruitment (Fig. 2 and
Table 1). The gray bars indicate the 4-s time period before the reported spontaneous thought onset, while the hand icons mark the time point corresponding to the button press. The
error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
192 M. Ellamil et al. / NeuroImage 136 (2016) 186–196
Fig. 7. Progression over time of brain activation associatedwith spontaneous thought reports, compared to word detection report (thought Nword), based on spatiotemporal Partial Least
Squares (PLS) analyses. During spontaneous thought trials, the (A) hippocampus, (B) parahippocampus, and (C) inferior parietal lobulewere engaged before the buttonpress (TR 2), while
the (D) temporopolar cortex, (E) insula, (F)medial prefrontal cortex, and (G) posterior cingulate cortexwere engaged during the button press (TR 3), and the (H) dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex and (J) lateral prefrontal cortexwere engaged after the button press (TR 4). Results are displayed in neurological orientation,with the right hemisphere depicted on the right, on the
average high-resolution structural image and thresholded using a bootstrap ratio (BSR) of 2.576 (equivalent to p b .01) and a spatial extent of 50 voxels.
Table 2
Activation over time associatedwith thought events (thought Nword), based on spatiotem-
poral Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis.
Region MNI coordinates
L/R/M BA x y z BSR TRs
Frontal
Medial orbital gyrus (MPFC) M 11 −8 38 −14 9.52 3*, 4
Dorsal ACC M 24 −2 18 24 4.11 3, 4*
Middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) L 9 −22 40 44 6.68 2, 3*, 4
Middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) R 9 28 38 30 4.79 2, 3, 4*
Middle frontal gyrus (RLPFC) L 10 −22 58 24 3.69 3, 4*
Middle frontal gyrus (RLPFC) R 10 24 54 24 3.23 3, 4*
Mid-insula R 13 38 4 −10 4.27 3*, 4
Posterior insula R 13 48 −10 4 5.26 3*, 4
Supplementary motor area M 6 4 32 62 3.68 2, 3*
Parietal
Posterior cingulate cortex M 31 0 −60 26 5.58 2, 3*,4
Inferior parietal lobule L 39 −46 −74 32 6.63 2, 3*, 4
Inferior parietal lobule R 39/40 50 −62 46 7.58 2*, 3, 4
Temporal
Hippocampus L 28 −14 −36 0 5.51 2*, 3
Parahippocampus L 36 −20 −20 −22 3.23 2*, 3
Parahippocampus R 36 14 −38 −6 4.57 2*, 3
Temporopolar cortex R 38 46 2 −38 4.54 3*, 4
Superior temporal gyrus L 22 −64 0 8 4.57 3*
Superior temporal gyrus R 22 62 −6 8 5.08 3, 4*
Occipital
Cuneus M 19 4 −92 28 6.27 2*, 3
Subcortical
Anterior cerebellum R – 28 −32 −30 4.74 2*, 3
Posterior cerebellum L – −46 −64 −38 4.02 2, 3*
Posterior cerebellum R – 46 −66 −36 5.01 2*, 3
Note. For each cluster, the TRs of activation are noted, and the peak of activation
(from which the bootstrap ratio and coordinates were taken) is indicated by an asterisk.
All clusters had bootstrap ratios (BSR) greater than 2.576 (equivalent to p b .01) and
had a spatial extent of at least 50 voxels.
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ports of spontaneously arising thoughts is consistent with previous
ﬁndings from single-cell recordings in humans showing that ﬁring
rates in medial temporal lobe neurons can peak up to several seconds
before memories spontaneously come to mind (Burke et al., 2014;
Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008), with only medial temporal lobe antecedent
activity correlated with memory performance (Burke et al., 2014).
Furthermore, electrical stimulation of medial temporal lobe structures
has been found to evoke thought-like or dream-like experiences far
more frequently than stimulation of other regions (Fish et al., 1993;
Selimbeyoglu and Parvizi, 2010). However, in contrast to these single-
cell ﬁndings from patients with epilepsy, the present results demon-
strate a key role for the medial temporal lobe during the generation of
spontaneous thought in a neurologically healthy sample.
The antecedent medial temporal lobe activation that we observed
may reﬂect spontaneously occurring reactivation and recombination
of memory traces – a process originally described during sleep but
also more recently identiﬁed during waking rest (Gelbard-Sagiv et al.,
2008). The medial temporal lobe is commonly associated with episodic
memory retrieval (Squire et al., 2004), but has also been found to sup-
port thinking about the future (Schacter and Addis, 2009), imagining
novel situations (Hassabis et al., 2007), and generating creative ideas
(Ellamil et al., 2012). It is also consistently recruited in the absence of
experimental tasks or during “rest” (Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff
et al., 2004; Stark and Squire, 2001). Medial temporal lobe-driven spon-
taneous reactivation and recombination of memory traces may inﬂu-
ence cortical activation patterns (O'Reilly et al., 2014), in the process
giving rise to spontaneously retrieved old episodicmemories or sponta-
neously generated novel mental simulations.
Memories or novel simulations are often said to “come to us” — a
phrase reﬂecting the common subjective experience of mental content
arising in a bottom-up fashion and capturing our attention reﬂexively
in the process. The neural antecedents identiﬁed in the present study
are consistent with this subjective experience. Bottom-up attentional
orienting towards retrieved memory content has been closely linked
to inferior parietal lobule recruitment (Cabeza et al., 2008). The
194 M. Ellamil et al. / NeuroImage 136 (2016) 186–196activation of the inferior parietal lobule prior to reports of spontaneous
thoughts suggests that reﬂexive attentional orienting towards sponta-
neously arising mental content may form an integral early part of the
process of spontaneous thought generation. At the same time, the ante-
cedent recruitment of paralimbic areas such as the posterior cingulate
cortex, rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and posterior insulamay reﬂect
the bottom-up tuning of attention towards salient features in the inter-
nal mental stream, including spontaneously generated memories
(Leech and Sharp, 2014), affective states (Lane et al., 1997), or body sen-
sations (Craig, 2002).
Some of the neural antecedents observed in the present study – such
as activations in the inferior parietal lobule and posterior cingulate cor-
tex – fall clearly within the boundaries of the default mode network
(Fig. S1). Other antecedent activations, however – such as, notably,
the posterior insula – would be considered well beyond even a liberal
boundary of this network (Fig. S1). This suggests that the early inception
of spontaneous thought may not be exclusively linked to default mode
network functions (for related arguments, see Christoff, 2012; Fox
et al., 2015). However, while the present results show antecedent co-
activation of brain regions both within and beyond the default mode
network, the question of how these brain regions interact and support
the early inception of spontaneous thought remains an important sub-
ject for further research.
While recruitment of the medial prefrontal cortex, temporopolar
cortex, mid-insula, lateral prefrontal cortex, and dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex are consistently associatedwithmind-wandering and related
spontaneous thought processes (Fox et al., 2015), none of the anteced-
ent activations identiﬁed in the present study were in these brain re-
gions. This is consistent with the idea that these brain regions may be
more involved in the subsequent elaboration or evaluation of spontane-
ous thought rather than its initial generation (Dixon et al., 2014; Fox and
Christoff, 2014). The medial prefrontal cortex, temporopolar cortex, and
mid-insula have been linked to the binding of emotional and physiolog-
ical information to external stimuli as well as internal experiences
(Craig, 2011; Ochsner andGross, 2008; Olson et al., 2007). Their recruit-
mentmay therefore reﬂect the automatic affective appraisals of sponta-
neously generated hippocampal-neocortical ﬁring patterns. Meanwhile,
the lateral prefrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex are
known to support metacognitive processing and higher-order abstract
thought (Carter et al., 1999; Christoff et al., 2009b; Christoff et al.,
2001; Fox and Christoff, 2014; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Their recruit-
ment may thus be associated with the metacognitive processing of
spontaneously arising mental content, such as their explicit evaluation,
categorization, or monitoring. Spontaneous activations in medial
temporal and paralimbic structures may serve as inputs to heteromodal
association areas, in the process giving rise to internally directed
cognition — similar to the way activations in primary and unimodal as-
sociation regions serve as inputs to heteromodal association areas, in the
process giving rise to externally directed cognition (Dixon et al., 2014).
Our results are consistent with such a model, but to test this more pre-
cisely it would be necessary to examine the generation of spontaneous
thoughts usingmodalities with higher temporal resolution such as elec-
troencephalography (EEG) or human intracranial recordings.
To what extent do experienced mindfulness meditators differ from
non-meditators in terms of the neural processes they recruit in associa-
tion with spontaneously arising thoughts? The recruitment of medial
temporal lobe, default mode, and executive control regions during
spontaneous thought in the present study closely parallels the pattern
of brain activation consistently associated with mind-wandering and
spontaneous thought in prior work using non-meditators and condi-
tions that do not require a high level of metacognitive awareness such
as “rest” periods and thought probes during easy tasks (Fox et al.,
2015). Furthermore, the present ﬁndings of medial temporal lobe
recruitment preceding spontaneous thought reports in meditators is
consistent with similar recruitment prior to spontaneously arising
memories in non-meditators (Burke et al., 2014; Gelbard-Sagiv et al.,2008). Mindfulness training has previously been shown to inﬂuence
the recruitment of default mode, executive control, and viscerosomatic
structures, whichmay reﬂect their importance formonitoring processes
during mindfulness practice (Bærentsen et al., 2010; Brefczynski-Lewis
et al., 2007; Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011). However, the amount of medita-
tion experience across participants in our study did not inﬂuence the
pattern of brain recruitment during spontaneous thought: this pattern
remained the same after the amount (i.e., hours) of meditation experi-
ence was entered as a covariate of no interest in the fMRI analysis.
Thus, our overall ﬁndings suggest that the pattern of brain recruitment
identiﬁed during spontaneous thought in thepresent study is not neces-
sarily speciﬁc tomindfulness practitioners butmay instead reﬂect more
general neural processes supporting spontaneous thought.
A number of previous neurophenomenological studies have inte-
grated ﬁrst-person subjective reports with third-person neural mea-
sures. For example, Libet and colleagues (Libet, 1985; Libet et al.,
1983) assessed neural recruitment prior to the volitional urge to act.
In contrast, the present study assessed neural recruitment during
the spontaneous arising of thoughts. Given that some thoughts are asso-
ciatedwith the urge to actwhile others are not, the phenomenon exam-
ined here is orthogonal to that assessed by the Libet experiments. In
addition, Hasenkamp and colleagues (Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012;
Hasenkamp et al., 2012) examined neural recruitment around the
time when the participant noticed becoming fully absorbed in a train
of thought and compared different attentional states duringmeditation
(i.e., mind wandering, awareness, shifting, and focusing). In contrast,
the present study examined neural recruitment around the time when
the participant detected the initial arising of an individual thought and
compared differently generated mental content (i.e., spontaneously
arising versus perceptually triggered). Thus, the present study made
use of neurophenomenology to investigate the spontaneous onset of
thoughts— a distinct aspect of thought that had remained unexamined
so far.
Despite the relatively low temporal resolution of fMRI signal, the
present results revealed consistent temporal differences in the dynam-
ics of recruitment surrounding the spontaneous arising of thought.
Further research will be necessary to determine the precise links be-
tween the timing of neural recruitment and the cognitive elements of
early thought inception. More speciﬁcally, the present ﬁndings can be
corroborated and further expanded by future investigations employing
methods with higher temporal resolution such as magnetoencephalog-
raphy (MEG) or large-scale human intracranial recordings (e.g., Burke
et al., 2014), in combination with more reﬁned phenomenological
reporting techniques (e.g., Petitmengin and Lachaux, 2013). This combi-
nation of approaches and methodological developments is already be-
ginning to set the stage for the systematic exploration of the neural
basis of spontaneous thought — a phenomenon that until recently
remained largely off-limits for scientiﬁc exploration, but is nowwell po-
sitioned to become part of the neuroscientiﬁc mainstream.
5. Conclusions
John Lennon famously sang, “Thoughts meander like a restless wind
inside a letter box. They tumble blindly as they make their way across
the universe.” What neural systems could give rise to such a wildly
divergent stream of consciousness? The prominent hippocampal re-
cruitment among the neural antecedents identiﬁed here suggests an in-
triguing possibility. In contrast to the connectivity of other cortical
areas, where short-distance synapses to nearby neurons predominate
and long-distance connections are rare, neurons within a large part of
the hippocampus are equally likely to connect to nearby or distant
neighbors (Buzsaki, 2006). This highly variablemicrocircuitrymay facil-
itate the creation of arbitrary or unlikely connections between groups of
neurons that otherwise encode distinct memories or experiences
(Buzsaki, 2006). This capacity for novel connections at the synaptic
level might be linked to the variability of spontaneous thought at the
195M. Ellamil et al. / NeuroImage 136 (2016) 186–196subjective level. Although the hippocampus is only one region among
those identiﬁed here as neural antecedents of spontaneous thought,
its role as an indexing system connecting many other brain areas
(Teyler and Rudy, 2007) suggests that divergent patterns of hippocam-
pal activation could lead to similarly divergent patterns of activation in
other regions throughout the brain. While the speciﬁc neural systems
underlying the restless nature of our minds remain a mystery, the pres-
ent ﬁndings bring us one step closer to understanding the neural basis
of our thoughts' universal meanderings.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.04.034.
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